DELEGATION FOR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE. Documentation by the Directorate General for Research and Documentation. Luxembourg, 29 May 1985 by unknown
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
.· 
/ 
!tl~_§!B!!~§!&_Q~f5~f5_!~!!!!!!~5 
Documentation by the Directorate General for Research and Documentation 
LUXEMBOURG, 
29 May 1985. 
I 
(This document exists in English only> 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR COMMITTEES 
AND INTERPARLIAMENTARY DELEGATIONS 
' 
PE 98.464 

THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE 
--------------------------------
This documentation comprises two press articles on the Strategic 
nefence Initiative <SDI>. 
The first is entitled 'The President's Choice: Star Wars or 
Arms Control', and was written by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, 
Robert s. McNamara and Gerard Smith<1>. It criticises the proposal made by 
President Reagan for a Strategic Defence Initiative. 
The second article is entitled 'Defense in Space is not Star Wars', 
(2) 
and was written by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Jastrow and Max M. Kampelman • 
It supports the proposal for a SDI. 
These articles comprisetwo of the most authoritative politico-military 
commentaries on the SDI proposaL. 
<1> Published in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 2, Winter 1984-85, pp. 264-278 
<2> Published in the New York Times Magazine, 27 January 1985, p. 28 ff. 
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' 
McGeorge Bundy 
Geo1ge R Kenna11 
RobertS. McNo111ara 
Gerard Smith 
THE PRESIDENT'S CHOICE: 
T STAR \\'ARS OR AIUIS CONTROL . he reelection of Ronald Reagan makes the future of 
his Strategic Defense Initiative the most important question of 
nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national 
agenda since 1972. The President is strongly committed to this 
program, and senior officials, including Secretary of Defense 
Caspar W. Weinberger, have made it clear that he plans to 
intensify this effort in his second term. Sharing the gravest 
reservations about this undertaking, and believing that unless 
it is radicalJy constrained during the next four years it will 
bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to man-
kind, we think it urgent to offer an assessment of the nature 
and hazards of this initiative, to call for the closest vigilance by 
Congress and the public, and even to invite the victorious 
President to reconsider. While we write only after obtaining 
the best technical advice we could find, our central concerns 
are political. We believe the President's initiative to be a classic 
case of good intentions that will have bad results because they 
do not respect reality. 
This new initiative was launched by the President on March 
23, 1983, in a surprising and quite personal passage at the end 
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from 1966 to mid-1979. He is currently Professor of History at New York 
University. 
George F. Kennan is Professor Emeritus at the Institute for Advanced 
Study, Princeton. He was U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1952, and 
to Yugoslavia, 1961-63, and is the author of Soviet-American Relations, 
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RobertS. McNamara was Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968 and 
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of a speech in praise of his other military programs. In that 
passage he ca11ed on our scientists to find means of rendering 
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." In the briefings that 
surrounded the speech, Administration spokesmen made it 
dear that the primary objective was the development of ways 
and means of destroymg hostile missiles:-meaning in the mam 
Soviet missiles-by a series of attacks a11 along their flight path, 
from their boost phase after launch to their entry into the 
atmosphere above the United States. Because of the central 
position the Administration itself gave to this objective, the 
program promptly acquired the name Star \\'ars, and the 
President's Science Advisor, George Keyworth, has admitted 
that this name is now indelible. We find it more accurately 
descriptive than the official "Strategic Defense Initiative. " 1 
II 
What is centra11y and fundamentally wrong with the Presi-
dent's objective is that it cannot be achieved. The overwhelm-
ing consensus of the nation's technical community is that in 
fact 1 here is no prospect whatever that science and technology 
can, at any time in the next several decades, make nuclear 
weapons "impotent and obsolete." The program developed 
over the last 18 months, ambitious as it is, offers no prospect 
for a leak-proof defense against strategic ballistic missiles alone, 
and it entirely excludes from its range any effort to limit the 
effectiveness of other systems-bomber aircraft, cruise mis-
siles, and smuggled warheads. 
The President's hopes are entirely understandable. There 
must be very few Americans who have never shared them. All 
four of us, like Mr. Reagan, grew up in a world without nuclear 
weapons, and we believe with pass1on that the world would be 
a much safer place without them. Americans should be con-
stantly on the alert for any possibilities that can help to reduce 
1 There has been an outpouring of technical comment on this subject, 
and even in a year and a half the arguments have evolved considerably. 
Two recent independent analyses on which we have drawn with confidence 
are The Reagan Strategic Deftnst Jnitit:ativt: A Technical, Political, and Arms 
Control Assmmtnt, by Sidney D. Drell, Philipj. Farley and David Holloway, 
A Special Report of the Center for International Security and Arms 
Control, .July 1984, Stanford: Stanford University, 1 984; and Tht Fallacy 
of Star Wars (based on studies conducted by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists and co-chaired by Richard l. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Henry 
W. Kendall), john Tirman, ed., New York: Vintage, 1984. 
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the nuclear peril in which we all live, and it is entirely natural 
that a hope of safety like the one the President held out should 
stir a warmly affirmative first response. But false hope, however 
strong and understandable, is a bad guide to action. 
The notion that nuclear weapons, or even ballistic missiles 
alone, can be rendered impotent by science and technology is 
an illusion. It reflects not only technological hubris in the face 
of the very nature- of nuclear weapons, but also a complete 
misreading of the relation between threat and response in the 
nuclear decisions of the superpowers. 
The first and greatest obstacle is quite simply that these 
weapons are destructive to a degree that makes them entirely 
different from any other weapon in history. The President 
frequently observes that over the centuries every new weapon 
has produced some countervailing weapon, and up to Htro-
shima he is right. But conventional weapons can be neutralized 
by a relatively low rate of kill, provided that the rate is sustained 
over time. The classic modern example is defense against non-
nuclear bombin~. If you lose one bomber in every ten sorties, 
your force will soon be destroyed. A pilot assigned to fly 30 
missions will face a 95-perccnt prospect of being shot down. A 
ten-percent rate of kill is highly effective. 
With nuclear weapons the calculation is totally different. 
Both Mr. Reagan's dre-am and his historical argument com-
pletely neglect the decisive fact that a very few nuclear 
weapons, exploding on or near population centers, would be 
hideously too many. At today's levels of superpower deplo,¥• 
ment-a bout 1 0,000 str.ttegic warheads on each side-even a 
95-percent kiJJ rate would be insufficient to save either society 
from disintegration in the event of general nuclear war. Not 
one of Mr. Reagan's technical advisers claims that any such 
level of protection is attainable. They know better. In the 
words of the officer in charge of the program, Lieutenant 
General james Abrahamson, "a perfect defense is not a realistic 
thing." In response to searching questions from Senator Sam 
Nunn of Georgia, the senior technical official of the Defense 
Department, Under Secretary Richard DeLauer, made it plain 
that he could not foresee any level of defense that would make 
our own offensive systems unnecessary. 
Among all the do1.ens of spoke!>men for the Administration, 
there is not one with any significant technical qualifications 
who has been willing to questiou Dr. DeLauer's explicit state-
ment that "There's no way an t'nemy can't overwhelm your 
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defenses if he wants to badly enough." The only senior official 
who continues to share the President's dream and assert his 
belief that it can come true is Caspar Weinberger, whose 
zealous professions of confidence are not accompanied by 
technical support. 
The terrible power of nuclear weaec!ns has a second meaning 
that decisively undermines the possibility of an effective Star 
Wars defense of populations. Not onl)· is their destructive 
power so great that only a kill rate closely approaching 100 
percent can give protection, but precisely because the weapons 
are so terrible neither of the two superpowers can tolerate the 
notion of "impotence" in the face of the arsenal of the oppo-
nent. Thus any prospect of a significantly improved American 
defense is absolutely certain to stimulat~ the most energetic 
Soviet efforts to ensure the continued ability of Soviet warheads 
to get through. Ever since Hiroshima it has been a cardinal 
principle of Soviet policy that the Soviet Union must have a · 
match for any American nuclear capability. It is fanciful in the 
extreme to suppose that the prospect of any new American 
deployment which could undermine the effectiveness of Soviet 
missile forces will not be met by a most determined and 
sustained response. 
This inevitable Soviet reaction is studiously neglected by 
Secretary Weinberger when he argues in defense of Star Wars 
that today's skeptics are as wrong as those who said we could 
never get to the moon. The effort to get to the moon was not 
complicated by the presence of an adversary. A platoon of 
hostile moon-men with axes could have made it a disaster. No 
one should understand the irrelevance of his analogy better 
than Mr. Weinberger himself. As secretary of defense he is 
bound to be familiar with the intensity of our own American 
efforts to ensure that our own nuclear weapons, whether on 
missiles or aircraft, will always be able to get through to Soviet 
targets in adequate numbers. 
The technical analyses so far available are necessarily incom-
plete, primarily because of the very large distance between the 
President's proposal and any clearly defined system of defense. 
There is some truth in Mr. Weinberger's repeated assertion 
that one cannot fully refute a proposal that as yet has no real 
content. But already important and enduring obstacles have 
been identified. Two are systemic and ineradicable. First, a 
Star Wars defense must work perfectly the very first time, since 
it can never be tested in ad\'ance as a full system. Second, it 
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must be triggered almost instantly, because the crucial boost 
phase of Soviet missiles lasts less than five minutes from the 
moment of launch. In that five minutes (which new launch 
technology can probably reduce to about 60 seconds), there 
must be detection, decision, aim, attack and kill. It is hard to 
imagine a scheme further removed from the kind of tested 
reliability and clear presidential control that we have hitherto 
required of systems mvolving nuclear danger. 
There are other .more general difficulties with the Presi-
dent's dream. Any remotely leak-proof defense against stra-
tegic missiles will require extensive deployments of many parts 
of the system in space, both for detection of any Soviet launch 
and, in most schemes, for transmission of the attack on the 
missile in its boost phase. Yet no one has been able to offer any 
hope that it will ever be easier and cheaper to deploy and 
defend large systems in space than for someone else to destroy 
them. The balance of technical judgment is that the advantage 
in any unconstrained contest in space will be with the side that 
aims to attack the other side's satellites. In and of itself this 
advantage constitutes a com,pelling argum~nt .-gainst space· 
based defense. 
Finally, as we have already noted, the President's program 
offers no promise of effecuve defense against anything but 
ballistic missiles. Even if we assume, against all the evidence, 
that a leak-proof defense could be achieved against these par-
ticular weapons, there would remain the difficulty of defense 
against cruise missiles, against bomber aircraft, and against the 
clandestine introduction of warheads. It is important to remem-
ber here that very small risks of these catastrophic events will 
be enough to force upon us the continuing need for our own 
deterrent weapons. We think it is interesting that among the 
strong supporters of the Star Wars scheme are some of the 
same people who were concerned about the danger of the 
strategic threat of the Soviet Backfire bomber only a few years 
ago. Is it likely that in the light of these other threats they will 
find even the best possible defense against missiles a reason for 
declaring our own nuclear weapons obsolete? 
Inadvertent but persuasive proof of this failing has been 
given by the President's science adviser. Last February, in a 
speech in Washington, Mr. Keyworth recognized that the So-
viet response to a truly successful Star Wars program would be 
to "shift their strategic resources to other weapons systems," 
and he made no effort to suggest that such a shift could be 
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prevented or countered, saying: "Let the Soviets move to 
alternate weapons systems, to submarines, cruise missiles, ad-
vanced technology aircraft. Even the critics of the Pre~ident's 
defense initiative agree that those weapons systems are far more 
stable deterrents tban are ICBMS [land-based missiles]." Mr. 
Keyworth, in short, is willing to accept all these other means 
of warhead delivery, and he appears to be entirely unaware 
that by· this acceptance he is conceding that even if Star Wars 
should succeed far beyond what any present technical consen-
sus can allow us to believe, it would fail by the President's own 
standard. 
The inescapable reality is that there is literally no hope that 
Star Wars can make nuclear weapons obsolete. Perhaps the 
first and most important political task for those who wish to 
save the country from the expensive and dangerous pursuit of 
a mirage is to make this basic proposition clear. As long as the 
American people believe that Star Wars offers real hope of. 
reaching the President's asserted ~oal, it will have a level of 
political support unrelated to reahty. The American people, 
properly and sensibly, would like nothing better than to make 
nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete, .. but the last thing r' 
they want or need is to F.Y an astronomic bill for a vastlr. 
intensified nuclear compeution sold to them under a false labe . 
Yet that is what Star Wars will bring us, as a closer look will 
show. 
Ill 
The second line of defense for the Star \Vars program, and 
the one which represents the real hopes and convictions of 
both military men and civilians at the levels below the optimistic 
President and his enthusiastic secretary of defense, is not that 
it will ever be able to defend all our people, but rather that it 
will allow us to defend some of our weapons and other military 
assets, and so, somehow, restrain the arms race. 
This objective is very different from the one the President 
has held out to the country, but it is equally unattainable. The 
Star Wars program is bound to exacerbate the competition 
between the superpowers in three major ways. It will destroy 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, our most important 
arms control agreement; it will directly stimulate both offensive 
and defensive systems on the Soviet side; and as long as it 
continues it will darken the/rospect for significant improve-
ment in the currently frigi relations between Moscow and 
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Washington. It will thus sharpen the very anxieties the Presi· 
dent wants to reduce. 
As presented to Congress last March, the Star Wars program 
calls for a five-year effort of research and development at a 
total cost of $26 billion. The Administration insists that no 
decision has been made to develop or deploy any component 
of the potential system, but a number of hardware demonstra-
tions are planned, and it is hoped that there can be an affirm-
ative decision on full-scale system development in the early 
1990s. By its very nature, then, the program is both enormous 
and very slow. This first $26 billion, only for research and 
development, is not much less than the full procurement cost 
of the new B-1 bomber force, and the timetable is such that 
Mr. Reagan's second term will end long before any deployment 
decision is made. Both the size and the slowness of the under-
taking reinforce the certainty that it will stimulate the strongest 
possible Soviet response. Its size makes it look highly threaten-
ing, while its slowness gives plenty of time for countermeasures. 
Meanwhile, extensive American production of offensive nu-
clear weapons will continue. The Administration has been at 
pains to insist that the Star Wars program in no way reduces 
the need for six new offensive systems. There are now two new 
land-based missiles, two new strategic bombers, and two differ-
ent submarine systems under various stages of development. 
The Soviets regularly list several other planned American 
deployments as strategic because the weapons can reach the 
Soviet homeland. Mr. Reagan recognized at the very outset 
that "if paired with offensive systems," any defensive systems 
"can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one 
wants that." But that is exactly how his new program, with its 
proclaimed emphasis on both offense and defense, is under-
stood in Moscow. 
We have been left in no doubt as to the Soviet opinion of 
Star Wars. Only four days after the President's speech, Yuri 
Andropov gave the Soviet reply: 
On the face of it, laymen may find it even attractive as the President speaks 
about what seem to be defensive measures. But this may seem to be so only 
on the face of it and only to those who are not conversant with these 
matters. In fact the strategic offensive forces of the United States will 
continue to be developed and upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definite 
line at that, namely that of acquiring a first nuclear strike capability. Under 
these conditions the intention to secure itself the possibility of destroying 
with the help of the ABM defenses the corresponding strategic systems of 
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the other side, that is of rendering it unable of dealing a retaliatory strike, 
is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat.2 
The only remarkable elements in this response are its clarity 
and rapidity. Andropov's assessment is precisely what we should 
expect. Our government, of course, does not intend a first 
strike, but we are building systems which do have what is called 
in our own jargon a prompt hard-target kill capabiHty, and the 
primary purpose of these systems is to put Soviet missiles at 
risk of quick destruction. Soviet leaders are bound to see such 
weapons as a first-strike threat. This is precisely the \'iew that 
our own planners take of Soviet missiles with a similar capabil-
ity. When the President launches a defensive program openly 
aimed at making Soviet missiles "impotent," while at the same 
time our own hard-target killers multiply, we cannot be sur-
prised that a man like Andropov saw a threat "to disarm the -
Soviet Union ... ~ Given Andropov's assessment, the Soviet re-
sponse to Star Wars is certain to be an intensification of both 
its offensive and defensive strategic efforts. 
Perhaps the easiest way to understand this political reality is 
to consider our own reaction to any similar Soviet announce-
ment of intent. The very thought that the Soviet Union might 
plan to deploy effective strategic defenses would certainly 
produce a most energetic American response, and the first and 
most important element of that response would be a determi-
nation to ensure that a sufficient number of our own missiles 
would always get through. 
Administration spokesmen continue to talk as if somehow 
the prospect of American defensive systems will in and of itself 
lead the Soviet government to move away from strategic mis-
siles. This is a vain hope. Such a result might indeed be 
conceivable if Mr. Reagan's original dream were real-if we 
could somehow ever deploy a perfect defense. But in the real 
world no system wiJJ ever be leak-proof; no new system of any 
sort is in prospect for a decade and only a fragmentary capa-
bility for years thereafter; numerous powerful countermea-
sures are readily available in the meantime, and what is at stake 
2 Cited in Sidney Drell tt al., op. cit., p.l 05. 
5 Richard Nixon has analyzed the possible impact of new defensive 
systems in even more striking terms: "Such systems would be destabilizing 
if they provided a shield so that you could use the sword." Los Angtlts 
Timts, July 1, 1984. 
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from the Russian standpoint is the deterrent value of their 
largest and strongest offensive forces. 
In this n~al world it is preposterous to suppose that Star Wars 
Gill produre anything but the most determined Soviet effort 
to make it fruitless. Dr. james Fletcher, chairman of an Admin~ 
ist ration parwl that reviewed the tcchniral prospects after thr-
Presidcnt's speech. has testified that "the ultimate utility ... 
of this system will depend not only on the technology itself, 
but on the extent to which the Soviet Union agrees to mutual 
defense arrangements and offense limitations." The plain im-
plication is that the Soviet Union can reduce the "utility" of 
Star Wars by refusing just such concessions. That is what we 
would do, and that is what they wiJJ do. 
Some apologists for Star Wars, although not the President, 
now defend it on the still more iimited ground that it can deny 
the Soviets a first-strike capability. That is conceivable, in that 
the indefinite proliferation of systems and countersystems 
would certainly create fearful uncertainties of all sorts on both 
sides. But as the Scowcroft Commission correctly concluded, 
the Soviets have no first-strike capability today, given our 
survivablt> forces and the ample existing uncertainties in any 
surpris(' attack. We believe there are much better ways than 
stratt·gic deft~n!>e to ensure that this situation is maimai1wd. 
Even a tightly limited and partially effective local defense of 
missile fields-itself something vastly different from Star 
Wars-would require radical amendment or repudiation of 
the ABM Treaty and would create such interacting fears of 
expanding defenses that we strongly believe it should be 
avoided. 
The President seems aware of the difficulty of making the 
Soviet Union accept his vision, and he has repeatedly proposed 
a solution that combines surface plausibility and intrinsic ab-
surdity in a way that tells a Jot about what is wrong with Star 
Wars itself. Mr. Reagan says we should give the Russians the 
secret of defense, once we find it, in return for their agreement 
to get rid of nuclear weapons. But the only kind of secret that 
could be used this way is one that exists only in Mr. Reagan's 
mind: a single magic formula that would make each side 
durably invulnerable. In the real world any defensive system 
will be an imperfect complex of technological and operational 
capabilities, full understanding of which would at once enable 
any adversary to improve his own methods of penetration. To 
share this kind of secret is to destroy its own effectiveness. Mr. 
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Rt•agan's solution is tts unreal as his original dream, and it rests 
on the same· failure of understanding. 
There i~ simply no escape from the reality that Star Wars 
offers not the promise of greater safety, but the certainty of a 
large-scale expansion of both offensive and dt.•fensive systems 
on both sides. We are not here examining the dismayed reac-
tion of our allies in Europe, but it is precisely this prospect that 
they foresee, in addition to the special worries created by their 
recognition that the ::>tar Wars program as it stands has nothing 
in it for them. Star Wars, in sum, is a prescription not for. 
ending or limiting the threat of nuclear weapons, but for a 
competition unlimited in expense, duration and danger. 
We have come this way before, following false hopes and 
finding our danger greater in the upshot. We did it when our 
government responded to the first Soviet atomic test by a 
decision to get hydrogen bombs if we could, never stopping to 
consider in any serious way whether both sides would be better 
ofT not to test such a weapon. We did it again, this time in the 
face of strong and sustained warning, when we were the first 
to deploy the multiple warheads (MIRVs) that now face us in · 
sm:h excessive numbers on Soviet missiles. Today, 15 years too 
lat<', we hav<· a consensus that MIRVS are bad for us, but we are 
still deploying them, and so are the Russians. 
IV 
So far we have been addressing the question of new efforts 
for strategic defense with only marginal attention to their 
intimate connection with the future of the most important 
single arms control agreement that we and the Soviet Union 
share, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The President's 
program, because of the inevitable Soviet reaction to it, has 
already had a heavily damaging impact on prospects for any 
early progress in strategic arms control. It has thrown a wild 
card into a game ah-eady impacted by mutual suspicion and by 
a search on both sides for unattainable unilateral advantage. It 
will soon threaten the very existence of the ABM Treaty. 
That treaty outlaws any Star Wars defense. Research is 
permitted, but the development of space-based systems cannot 
go beyond the laboratory stage without breaking the Treaty. 
That would be a most fateful step. We strongly agree with the 
finding of the Scowcroft Commission, in its final report of 
March 1984, that "the strategic implications of ballistic missile 
defense and the criticality of the ABM Treaty to further arms 
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control agreements dictate extreme caution in proceeding to 
engineering development in this sensitive area . ., 
The ABM Treaty stands at the very center of the effort to 
limit the strategic arms race by international agreements. It 
became possible when the two sides recognized that the pursuit 
of defensive systems would ine\'itably lead to an expanded 
competition and to greater insecurity for both. ln·its underlying 
mt·aning, the Treaty is a safeguard less against defense as such 
than against unbridled competition. The continuing and ex-
cessive competition that still exists in offensive weapons would 
have been even worse without the ABM Treaty, which remo\'ed 
from the calculations of both sides any fear of an early and 
destabilizing defensive deployment. The consequence over the 
following decade was profoundly constructive. Neither side 
attempted a defer.sive deployment that predictably would have 
given much more fear to the adversary than comfort to the 
possessor. The ABM Treaty, in short, reflected a common 
understanding of exactly the kinds of danger with which Star 
Wars now confronts the world. To lose the Treaty in pursuit 
of the Star Wars mirage would be an act of folly. 
The defeme of the ABM Treaty is thus a first requirement 
for all who wish to limit the damage done by the Star Wars 
program. Fortunately the Treaty has wide public support, and 
the Administration has stated that it plans to do nothing in its 
five-year program that violates any Treaty dause. Yet by its 
very existence the Star Wars effort is a threat to the future of 
the ABM Treaty, and some parts of the announced five-year 
program raise questions of Treaty compliance. The current 
program envisions a series of hardware demonstrations, and 
one of them is described as "an advanced boost-phase detection 
and tracking system." But the ABM Treaty specifically forbids 
both the development and the testing of any "spaced-based,. 
components of an anti-ballistic missile system. We find it hard 
to see how a boost-phase detection system could be anything 
but space-based, and we are not impressed by the Administra-
tion's claim that such a system is not sufficiently significant to 
be called "a component." 
We make this point not so much to dispute the detailed shape 
of the current program as to emphasize the strong need for 
close attention in Congress to the protection of the ABM Treaty. 
The Treaty has few defenders in the Administration-the 
President thought it wrong in 1972, and Mr. Weinberger 
thinks so still. The managers of the program are under more 
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pressure for quick results than for pro~sals respectful of the 
Treaty. In this situation a heavy responsibility falls on Congress, 
which has already shown this year that it has serious reserva-
tions about the President's dream. Interested members of 
Congress are well placed to ensure that funds are not provided 
for activities that would violate the Treaty. In meeting this 
r~sponsibility, and indeed in monitoring the Star Wars program 
as a whole, Congress can readily get the help of advisers drawn 
from among the many outstanding experts whose judgment 
has not been silenced or muted by co-option. Such use of 
independent counselors is one means of repairing the damage 
done by the President's unfortunate dectsion to launch his 
initiative without the benefit of any serious and unprejudiced 
scientific assessment. 
The Congress should also encourage the Administration 
toward a new and more vigorous effort to insist on respect for 
the ABM Treaty by the Soviet government as well. Sweeping 
charges of Soviet cheating on arms control agreements are 
clearly overdone. It is deeply unimpressive, for example, to 
catalogue asserted violations of agreements which we ourselves 
have refused to ratify. But there is one quite clear instance of 
largt·-scalc construction that does not appear to be consistent 
with the ABM Treaty-a large radar in central Siberia near the 
city of Krasnoyarsk. This radar is not yet in operation. but the 
weight of technical judgment is that it is designed for the 
detection of incoming missiles, and the ABM Treaty, in order 
to forestall effective missile defense systems, forbade the erec-
tion of such early warning radars except along the borders of 
each nation. A single highly vulnerable radar installation is of 
only marginal importance in relation to any large-scale break-
out from the ABM Treaty, but it does raise exactly the kinds of 
questions of intentional violation which are highly destructive 
in this country to public confidence in arms control. 
On the basis of informed technical advice, we think the most 
likely purpose of the Krasnoyarsk radar is to give early warning 
of any attack by submarine-based U.S. missiles on Soviet missile 
fields. Soviet military men, like some of their counterparts in 
our own country, appear to believe that the right answer to 
the threat of surprise attack on missiles is a policy of launch-
under-attack. and in that context the Krasnoyarsk radar, which 
fills an important gap in Soviet warning systems, becomes 
understandable. Such understanding does not make the radar 
anything else but a violation of the express language of the 
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Treaty, but it does makt it a matter which can be discussed 
and resolved without any paralyzing fear that it is a clear first 
signal of massive violations yet to come. Such direct and serious 
discussion with the Soviets might even allow the two sides to 
consider together the intrinsic perils in a common policy of 
launch-under-attack. But no such sensitive discussions will be 
possible while Star Wars remains a non-negotiable centerpiece 
of American strategic policy. 
Equal in importance to defending the ABM Treaty is pre-
ventmg hasty overcommitment of financial and scientific re-
sources to totally unproven schemes o\'erflowing with un-
knowns. The President's men seem determined to encourage 
an atmosphere of crisis commitment to just such a manner of 
work, and repeated comparisons to the Manhattan Project of 
1942-45, small in size and crystal-clear in purpose by compar-
ison, are not comfoning. On the shared basis of conviction 
that the President's dream is unreal, members of Congress can 
and should devote themselves with energy to the prevention 
of the kind of vested interest in very· large-scale ongoing 
expenditures which has so often kept alive other programs that 
were truly impotent, in terms of their own announced objec-
tives. We believe that there is not much chance that deploy· 
ments remotely like those currently sketched in the Star Wars 
program will ever in fact occur. The mere prospect of them 
will surely provoke the Russians to action, but it is much less 
likely that paying for them will in the end make sense to the 
American people. The larger likelihood is that on their way to 
oblivion these schemes will simply cost us tens and even 
hundreds of billions of wasted dollars.• 
In watching over the Star Wars budget the Congress may 
find it helpful to remember the summary judgment that Sen-
ator Arthur Vandenberg used to offer on programs he found 
wanting: "The end is unattainable, the means hare-brained, 
and the cost staggering." But at the same time we believe 
strongly in the continuation of the long-standing P.?licy of 
maintaining a prudent level of research on the scienufic possi-
bilities for defense. Research at a level ample for insurance 
• The Russians have their own program, of course. But they are not 
about to turn our technological flank in the technologies crucial for ABM 
systems. "According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the United States 
has a lead in computers, optics, automated control, electro-optical sensors, 
propulsion, radar, software, telecommunications. and guidance systems." 
Drell et al., ,op. cit., p. 21. 
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against some Soviet surprise can be continued at a fraction of 
the cost of the present Star Wars program. Such a change of 
course would have the great advantage of preventing what 
would otherwise be a grave distortion of priorities not only in 
defense research but in the whole national scientific effort. 
v 
This has not been a cheerful analysis, or one that we find 
pleasant to present. If the President makes no major change of 
course in his second term, we see no alternative to a long, hard, 
damage-limiting effort by Congress. But we choose to end on 
a quite different note. We believe that any American president 
who has won reelection in this nuclear age is bound to ask 
himself with the greatest seriousness just what he wants to 
accomplish in his second term. We have no doubt of the deep 
sincerity of President Reagan's desire for good arms control 
agreements with the Soviet Union, and we believe his election 
night assertion that what he wants most in foreign affairs is to 
reach just such agreements. We are also convinced that if he 
asks serious and independent advisers what changes in curren~ 
American policy will help most to make such agreements pos~ 
sible in the next four years, he will learn that it is possible to 
reach good agreements, or possible to insist on the Star Wars 
program as it stands, but wholly impossible to do both. At 
exactly that point, we believe', Mr. Reagan could, should, and 
possibly would encourage the serious analysis of his negotiating 
options that did not occur in his first term. 
We do not here explore these possibilities in detail. They 
would certainly include a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, and 
an effort to improve it by broadening its coverage and tighten-
ing some of its Jangua~e. There should also be a further 
exploration of the posstbility of an agreement that would 
safeguard the peaceful uses of space, uses that have much 
greater value to us than to the Soviets. We still need and lack 
a reliable cap on strategic warheads, and while Mr. Reagan has 
asked too much for too little in the past, he is right to want 
reductions. He currently has some advisers who fear all forms 
of arms control, but advisers can be changed. We are not 
suggesting that the President will change his course lightly. We 
simply believe that he does truly want real progress on arms 
control in his second term, and that if he ever comes to 
understand that he must choose between the two, he will choose 
the pursuit of agreement over the demands of Star Wars. 
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We have one final deep and strong belief. We think that if 
there is to be a real step away from nuclear danger in the next 
four years, it will have to begin at the level of high politics, 
with a kind of communication between Moscow and Washing-
ton that we have not seen for more than a decade. One of the 
most unfortunate aspects of the Star Wars initiative is that it 
was launched without any attempt to discuss it seriously, in 
advance, with the Soviet government. It represented an explicit 
expression of the President's belief that we should abandon the 
shared view of nuclear defense that underlies not only the ABM 
Treaty but all our later negotiations on strategic weapons. To 
make a public announcement of a change of this magnitude 
without any effort to discuss it with the So\'iets was to ensure 
increased Soviet suspicion. This error, too, we have made in 
earlier decades. If we are now to have renewed hope of arms 
control, we must sharply elevate our attention to the whole 
process of communication with Moscow. 
Such newly serious communication should begin with frank 
and explicit recognition by both sides that the problem of 
nuclear danger is in its basic reality a common problem, not just 
for the two of us, but for all the world-and one that we shall 
never resolve if we cannot transcend negotiatin~ procedures 
that give a veto to those in each country who msist on the 
relentlessly competitive maintenance and enlargement of what 
are already, on both sides, exorbitantly excessive forces. 
If it can ever be understood and accepted, as a starting point 
for negotiation, that our community of interest in the problem 
of nuclear danger is greater than all our various competitive 
concerns put together, there can truly be a renewal of hope, 
and a new prospect of a shared decision to change course 
together. Alone among the presidents of the last 12 years, 
Ronald Reagan has the political strength to lead our country 
in this new direction if he so decides. The· renewal of hope 
cannot be left to await another president without an appeal to 
the President and his more sober advisers to take a fresh hard 
look at Star Wars, and then to seek arms control instead. 
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Faith moves mountains. When it is in eternal religious values, faith 
is an indispensable strength of the human spirit. When it is directed 
toward political choices, it is often an excuse for an analytic paralysis. 
Regrettably, our national debate over President Reagan's suggestion 
that the country develop a strategic defense against a Soviet nuclear attack 
is taking on a theological dimension that has no place in a realistic search 
f~r a path out of the world's dilemma. The idea of basing our security on the 
ability to defend ourselves deserves serious consideration. Certainly, 
the role of strategic defense was a major issue in the recent dialogue in 
Geneva between United States Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko on new arms-control negotiations. 
For many years, our search for security has been restricted to 
aesigning offensive weapons to deter aggression through fear of reprisals. 
We must not abandon nuclear deterrence until we are convinced that a better 
means is at hand. But we cannot deny that, for both the Soviet Union and the 
United States, the costs, insecurities and tensions surrounding this search 
for newer, more effective and more accurate nuclear missiles produce a profound 
u~ease that in itself undermines stability. 
The conventional view is that stability in the nuclear age is based 
on two contradictory pursuits: the acquisition of increasingly efficient 
nuclear weapons and the negotiation of limits and reductions in such weapons. 
The United States is diligently pursuing both objectives, but the complexity 
Gf arriving at effectual arms control agreements is becoming apparent as more 
~recise and mobile weapons, with multiple warheads, appear on both sides. 
Unlike ours, moreover, many Soviet missile silos are reloadable, and thus the 
number of silos does not indicate the number of missiles, further complicating 
verification. 
We must never ignore the reality that the overwhelming majority of 
the Soviet strategic forces is composed of primarily first-strike weaponry. 
And given the large numbers of first-strike Soviet SS-17, 18 and 19 load-based 
missiles, no responsible American leader can make decisions about security 
needs without acknowledging that a Soviet first strike can become a practical 
option. 
of 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, professor/Government at Columbia University and senior 
adviser at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown 
University, was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. Robert 
Jastrow, a physicist and professor of earth sciences at Dartmouth, is the 
founder of the Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Max M. Kampelman, a 
Washington lawyer, has been named to head the US Delegation to the new arms 
~ontrol talks with the Soviet Union. Each author contributed individual 
sections to this article, which they edited and rewrote jointly. 
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The Russians could strike us first by firing the reloadable portion 
of their nuclear arsenal at our missiles, the Strategic Air Command and 
~uclear submarine bases, and if the surviving American forces <essentially 
nuclear submarines) were to respond, the Russians could immediately counter 
by attacking our cities with missiles from nonreloadable silos and, a few 
hours later, with whatever of their first-strike reloadable weapons had survived 
our counterattack. They are set up for launching three salvos to our one. 
To us, this catastrophic exchange is unthinkable. But, with the 
strong probability that the American response would be badly crippled at the 
outset by a Soviet strike, some Russian leader could someday well consider 
such a potential cost bearable in the light of the resulting 'victory•. 
furthermore, such an analysis might well anticipate that an American President 
knowing that a strike against our cities would inevitably follow our response 
to a Soviet first strike, might choose to avoid such a catastrophe by making 
important political concessions. No responsible American President can permit 
this country to have to live under such a threat, not to speak of the 
hypothetical danger of having to choose either annihilation or submission 
to nuclear blackmail. Hence the understandable and continual drive for 
;nore effective offensive missiles to provide greater deterrence. 
The result is that weapons technology is shaping an increasingly 
precarious American-Soviet strategic relationship. . For this reason, we 
urge serious consideration be given to whether some form of Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SO!) might not be stabilising, enhancing to deterrence and even 
helpful to arms control. To that end, we address the major issues in strategic 
defense from three points of view: 
(i) The technical: Is a defense against missiles technically and budgetarily 
feasible? 
<ii) The strategic: Is a defense against missiles strategically desirable? 
Does it enhance or diminish stability? Does it enhance or diminish the prospects 
for arms control and a nuclear-weapons build-down? 
<iii) The political: What are the political implications of strategic 
defence for our own country and for our relations with our allies? What are 
the implications for the larger dimensions of our relationship with the Soviet 
Union? How do we seek the needed domestic consensus on a viable strategy? 
A great deal has been writtenabout the state of missile-defense 
technology. SoMe experts say the technology sought is unattainable, otl•ers 
that it is merely unattainable in this generation. Yet the promise of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative is real. Some of the technologies are mature 
and unexotic. Their deployment around the end of this decade would involve 
mainly engineering development. Technically, these vital defenses could be 
in place at this moment were it not for the constraints accepted by the United 
States in its adherence to the antiballistic missile treaty of 1972. 
With development and some additional research, we can now construct 
and deploy a two-layer or double-screen defense, which can be in place by the 
early 1990's at a cost we estimate to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 
$80 billion. A conservative estimate of the effectiveness of each layer would 
be 70 per cent. The combined effectiveness of the two layers would be over 
90 per cent: Less than one Soviet warhead in 10 would reach its target -
more than sufficient to discourage Soviet leaders from any thought of achieving 
a successful first strike. 
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The first layer, in the two-layer defense system- the 'boost-phase' 
defense - would go into effect as a Soviet first-strike missile, or 'booster' 
carrying multiple warheads rises above the atmosphere at th~ beginnina of 
its trajectory. This boost-phase defense - based on interception and 
destruction by non-nuclear projectiles - would depend on satellites for the 
surveillance of the Soviet missile field and the tracking of missiles as they 
rise from their silos. These operations could only be carried out from 
space platforms orbiting over the Soviet Union. Because they are weightless 
in orbit, such platforms could be protected against attack by heavy armor, 
onboard weapons and manoeuverability. 
After the booster has burned out and fallen away, the warheads are 
through space on their way to the United States. The second layer of the 
defense - the terminal defense - comes into play as the warheads descend. 
interception would be at considerable altitude, above the atmosphere if possible. 
ihis second phase requires further engineering, already under way, because 
interception above the atmosphere makes it difficult to discriminate between 
real warheads and decoys. In the interim, interception can take place in 
the atmosphere, where differences in air drag separate warheads from decoys. 
In either event, destruction of the warheads would take place at sufficiently 
high altitudes, above 100,000 feet, so that there would be no ground damage 
from warheads designed to explode when approached by an intercepting missile. 
Of the two layers in the defense, the boost phase is by far the most 
important. It would prevent the Russians from concentrating their warheads 
on such high-priority targets as the national-command authority (the chain of 
command, beginning with the President, for ordering a nuclear strike>, key 
intercontinental-ballistic missile silos or the Trident submarine pens, 
because they could not predict which booster and which warheads would escape 
destruction and get through. 
This fact is important. Simply a so-called 'point defense' of 
our missile silos, it has been suggested, would be sufficient to restore much 
~f the credibility of our land-based deterrent, now compromised by 6,000 
Soviet ICBM warheads. It is particularly necessary to protect the 550 silos 
containing our Minuteman III ICBM's, of which 300 have the highly precise 
Mark 12A warheads. These are the only missiles in the possession of the 
United States with the combination of yield and accuracy required to destroy 
hardened Soviet military sites and the 1,500 hardened bunkers that would shelter 
the Soviet leadership. But their very importance to us illustrates the 
difficulty of a point defense, because the value of the silos to us means they 
will be among the highest-priority targets in any Soviet first strike. 
The Russians can overwhelm any point defense we place around those silos, if 
they wish to do so, by allocating large numbers of warheads to these critical 
targets. But if we include a boost-phase defense to destroy their warheads 
~t the time of firing, their objective becomes enormously more difficult to 
accomplish. 
The boost-phase defense has still another advantage. It could 
effectively contend with the menace of the Soviet SS-18's, monster missiles 
twice the size of the 97.5-ton. MX. Each SS-18 carries 10 warheads, but 
probably could be loaded with up to 30. The Russians could thus add thousands 
~f ICBM warheads to their arsenal at relatively modest cost. With numbers 
like that, the costs favour the Russians. But a boost-phase defense can 
eliminate all a missile's warheads at one time - an effective response to the 
SS-18 problem. 
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The likely technology for an early use of the boost-phase defense 
uould use 'smart' nonnuclear projectiles that home in on the target, using 
radar or heat waves, and destroy it on impact. The technology is close at 
hand and need not wait for the availability of the more devastating but less 
mature technologies of the laser, the neutral particle beam or the electro-
magnetic rail gun. The interceptor rocket for this early boost-phase defense 
could be derived from air-defense interceptors that will soon be available, 
or the technology of antisatellite missiles (ASAT> launched from F-15 aircraft. 
These rockets could weigh about 500 pounds, the non-nuclear supersonic projectiles 
about 10 pounds. 
Interceptor rockets would be stored in pods on satellites and fired 
from space. The tracking information needed to aim the rockets would also 
be acquired from satellites orbiting over the Soviet missile fields. The so-
called 'space weapons' of strategic defense are indispensable for the crucial 
boost-phase defense. To eliminate them would destroy the usefulness of the 
defense. 
We estimate that the cost of establishing such a boost-phase defense 
by the early 1990's would be roughly $45 billion. That price tag includes 
100 satellites, each holding 150 interceptors - sufficient to counter a mass 
Soviet attack from all their 1,400 silos; plus four geosynchronous satellites 
and 10 low-altitude satellites dedicated to surveillance and tracking; plus 
the cost of facilities for ground-control communications and battle management. 
The technology used for the terminal defense could be a small, 
nonnuclear homing interceptor with a heat-seeking sensor, which would be 
launched by a rocket weighing one or two tons and costing a few million 
d~llars each. Interception would take place above the atmosphere, if possible, 
to give wider 'area' protection to the terrain below. These heat-seeking 
interceptors can be available for deployment in about five years if a decision 
is reached to follow that course. One concept for this technology was tested 
successfully last June by the Defense Department, when an intercepting missile 
zeroed in on an oncoming warhead at an altitude of 100 miles and destroyed it. 
The technology for a terminal defense within the atmosphere would 
be somewhat different, but would probably also depend on heat-seeking missiles. 
The cost of this terminal layer of defense would be about $15 billion and 
include $10 billion for 5,000 interceptors, plus $5 billion for 10 aircraft 
carrying instruments for tracking of the Soviet warheads. 
The estimated $60 billion for this two-layer defense is a ball-
park figure, of course. However, even with its uncertainties, it is surely 
an affordable outlay for protecting our country from a nuclear first strike. 
To be sure, the above is not an attractive option to those who place 
all their eggs in the arms-control basket and underestimate the immense difficulty 
cf attaining an effective and truly verifiable pact. It is also not appealing 
to those wedded to the ~ea that it is best to assure survival by simply maintaining 
the perilous balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
We favour energetically pursuing arms-control negotiations and seeking to achieve 
credible deterrence, but these options by themselves are unfortunately not as 
likely to provide a more secure future as the alternative strategy of mutual 
security combining defense against missiles with retaliatory offense. 
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The simplest and most appealing option, quite naturally, is comprehensive 
arms control. Large reductions in both launchers and warheads, as well as 
effective restrictions on surreptitious deployment or qualitative improvements, 
would enhance nuclear stability and produce greater mutual confidence. It 
uould, if properly negotiated and effectively monitored, enhance mutual 
~urvival. 
How likely is such a future? Some progress in arms control is 
probably possible, but genuinely effective arms control would require that: 
<1> there be a restraint imposed on qualitative weapons enhancement; <2> 
mobile systems, relatively easy to deploy secretly, be subject to some form of 
1irect verification; <3> a method be devised for distinguishing nuclear-
armed and nonnuclear cruise missiles, and (4) monitoring arrangements be 
devised for preventing surreptitious development, testing and deployment 
of new systems. So far, the Soviet record of compliance with the SALT I 
and SALT II accords is sufficiently troubling to warrant skepticism regarding 
the likelihood of implementing any such complex and far-reaching agreement. 
Moreover, such an agreement would have to recognise that it is no 
longer possible to limit space-based systems without imposing a simultaneous 
limit, along the above lines, on terrestrially deployed systems, which present 
the greater threat to survival. After all, the space-based defenses include 
no weapons of mass destruction and no nuclear weapons. And it should be some 
cause for concern to note the Soviet insistence on prohibiting space-based 
defensive systems, the only method now available to inhibit the first-strike 
use of land-based Soviet offensive systems. 
Finally, a comprehensive and genuinely verifiable agreement, limiting 
both qualitatively and ~itatively the respective strategic forces, on earth 
and in space, will require a much more felicitous political element than 
currently exists. Negotiations may lead to such improvement, but in the 
setting of intense and profound geopolitical rivalry, how realistic is it to 
expect in the near future accommodation sufficient to generate the political 
will essential for a genuine breakthrough in arms-control negotiations? 
The mere mention of Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Sakharov and Soviet violations 
of the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act dramatise the depths 
of the problem. There may be no direct negotiating linkage between these 
acts of Soviet misconduct and arms control, but their political inter-action 
is evident. 
This is why there is currently such an emphasis on maintaining peace 
via the doctrine of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction, called MAD. 
~ut what does this mean in an age when weapons are becoming incredibly precise, 
mobile and difficult to count? In the absence of a miraculous breakthrough 
in arms control, the only possible protection within the framework of the 
deterrence approach is to stockpile more offensive systems. This is in part 
what we are doing. But how many of such systems will be needed in the likely 
conditions of the next decade? If Soviet strategic forces continue to grow 
both quantitatively and qualitatively, our country will have to deploy, at 
enormous cost, probably no fewer than 1,500 to 2,000 mobile Hidgetmen to 
preserve deterrence. How will they be deployed? Where? And at what cost? 
And will the Soviet Union and the United States be more or less secure with 
the deployment of such precise weaponry capable of effective p~emption? 
The Soviet answer is clear: The Russians are busy enhancing the survivability 
of their leadership and of their key facilities by hardening, dispersal and 
deception. 
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This second traditional alternative, mutual assured destruction, 
Cdnnot b~ an acceptable, long-run option, although it is a necessary policy 
in the ab~ence of an alternative, given the dynamics of weapons technology. 
Thus, a r1ew third option,the Strategy of Mutual Security, must be explored 
as preferable. The combination of defense against space missiles with 
retaliatory offense in reserve enhances deterrence. 
And it does not compromise stability, even if only the United States 
were initially to have such a strategic defense. The deployment of the systems 
described above would not give us absolute protection from Soviet retaliation 
against a possible first strike by us, a reasonable though misplaced Soviet 
concern. Furthermore, the Russians know we are not deploying first-strike 
counterforce systems in sufficient numbers to make a first strike by us 
feasible. In any case, one can be quite certain that the Russians will also 
be moving to acquire an e~anced strategic defense, even if they do not accept 
President Reagan's offer to share ours. Indeed, they are doing so now and 
have been for some time. 
As our strategic space-defense initiative expands incrementally, it 
should be realistically possible to scale down our offensive forces. Such a 
transition, first of the United States and eventually of the Soviet Union, 
into a genuinely defensive posture, with neither side posing a first-strike 
threat to the other, would not only be stabilising but it would also be most 
helpful to the pursuit of more far-reaching arms-control agreements. 
Strategic defense would compensate for the inevitable difficulties of verifi-
cation and for the absence of genuine trust by permitting some risk-taking in 
such agreements. This is another reason why strategic defense should not be 
t•·aded in the forthcoming negotiations in return for promises that can be 
broken at any time. 
No significant public policy can be carried out in a democracy without 
being fully discussed and accepted by the broad polity. Nor can an interested 
public be expected to resolve disputes among experts as to questions of 
technical feasibility. The current debate over President Reagan's initiative 
f0r a strategic defense programme suffers from that conflict among scientists. 
It is important to clarify this issue. 
We can begin a two-tiered strategic defense that would protect 
command structure as well as our missiles and silos and thus discourage any 
thoughts by the Soviet military that a first-strike effort would be effective. 
Some within the scientific community minimise the importance of this technical 
feasibility and emphasise instead the view that it is scientifically impossible 
today to provide a strategic defense that will protect our cities. Such a 
broad defense of populations is today not feasible, but it is prudent for our 
society to keep in mind the rising tide of technical and scientific advances so 
rapidly overwhelming the 20th century. 
The 'impossible' is a concept we should use with great hesitation. 
It is foolhardy to predict the timing of innovations. We are persuaded that 
the laws of physics do not in any way prevent the technical requirements of a 
defensive shield that would protect populations as well as weapons. A total 
shield should remain our ultimate objective, but there is every reason for 
t•s to explore transitional defenses, particularly because the one we have discussed 
would serve to deter the dangers of a first strike. Defenses against 
ballistic missiles can be effective without being 'perfect' and the technology 
for this is nearly in hand. 
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Society must also not forget that ever since the beginning of the 
scientific age, the organised scientific community has not had a particularly 
£OOd record of predicting developments thatwerenot part of the common wisdom 
0f the day. In 1926, for example, A.W. Bickerton, a British scientist, s~id 
it was scientifically impossible to send a rocket to the moon. In the weapons 
field, United States Adm. William D. Leahy told President Harry S. Truman in 
1945: 'That [atomic] bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in 
explosives'. And Or. Vannevar Bush, who directed the Government's World War II 
~cience effort, said after the war that he rejected the talk 'about a 3,000 
mile rocket shot from one continent to the other carrying an atom1c bomb ... 
and we can leave that out of our thinking.' In the strategic area, dS lat<~ 
as 1965, the cclpable Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wrote: 
'There is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic 
force as large as our own'. 
Our debate and our discussion, furthermore, must not ignore what 
the Russians, who have always understood the need for defenses, are doing in 
space. They have spent more on strategic defensive forces since the anti-
ballistic missile <ABM) treaty was signed in 1972 than on strategic offensive 
forces. Their antisatellite programme began nearly two decades ago. 
lhe Soviet military is now working aggressively on a nationwide missile-
r~tense system; and it now appears ready to deploy a system capable of 
defending the country not only against aircraft, but also many types of 
b~llistic missiles. Clearly the Soviet work in str~tegic defense has taken 
plnc~ in spite of AAM treaty prov1s1ons. The large radar installation 
in central Siberia expressly violates that treaty with us. Yet the planning 
for it must have begun many years ago. 
fhe recent Geneva meeting must be considered a major productive 
result of President Reagan'~ March 1983 speech announcing that we would 
begin developing a strategic defense initiative. We are reminded that 
in 1967 President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed to Prime Minister Aleksei 
N. Kosygin a ban on ABM's, which was flatly rejected. In 1969 President 
Nixon proposed to the Congress that our country begin such an ABM programme 
because the Russians showed little desire to join us in prohibiting such 
weapons. Shortly after Congress approved that programme, the Russians 
embraced the idea of an ABM treaty. Had our Government not announced 
its SOl programme we might still be in the cold storage of the Soviet freeze 
precipitated by their walking out of the Geneva negotiations. 
Arms control has been said to be at a dead end, and the stalemate 
has reflected an impasse in thought and in conception. Our present policy 
requires both us and the Soviet Union to rely on a theory of mutual annihilation 
based on a strategic balance of offensive weapons. The American approach 
h~s been to depend on deterrence alone and not on defending ourselves from 
Soviet offensive weapons, while the Russians have made it clear by their 
actions that they intend to defend themselves against our missiles. In 
any event, what is clear is that mankind must find ways of lifting itself 
out of this balance of terror. Mutual assured destruction must be replaced 
by mutual assured survival. Our safety cannot depend on our having no 
defense against missiles. The proper role of government is to protect 
the country from aggression, not merely avenge it. It is astounding that 
a President should be faulted for seeking a formula and an approach that 
will protect us from the continual threats and terrors coming from the 
volatil~ vagaries of adventurism and miscalculation. 
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Even if a p~~fect defense of our population should be imposs~bLe ~o 
ac~ieve - and none of us can be certain of that - the leaders of our Government 
have a responsibility to seek defense alternatives designed to complicate and 
frustrate aggression by our adversaries. The very injection of doubt into 
their calculations strengthens the prospect of hesitation and deterrence. 
It may not be possible to destroy the world's ballistic missiles, but if we 
can return them to the status of a retaliatory deterrent rJther than a pre-
emptive strike we will have reduced the need for the existing lJrge arsen~l 
anJ ther~by the threat of war. 
The argument has been made that the SOl is politically harmful 
because our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies have not received the 
initiative with any enthusiasm. Their skepticism is an understandabl0 initial 
reaction. First of all, our allies were taken by surprise by the President's 
March proposal oi a Strategic Defense ~itiative. At times, se~ret discussions 
are necessary, but doubtless allied coope~ation will be forthcoming in direct 
proportion to timely and honest consultation. Furthermore, European political. 
leaders feel under great pressure from an activist peace movement that emphasises 
traditional arms-control negotiations as a major objective. A new approach, 
which the Rc1ssians criticise as hostile, is, therefore, looked upon as troubling, 
regardless of its merit. 
As to the substance of the initiative, coupling our national s~curity 
interest with that of our allies is a foundation of NATO defense. Any tendency 
toward d~coupling produces great concern on their part. Western European 
leaders look upon all security proposals with that criterion in mind. 
Shot1lrl Amrrica terhnicaLly succeed in providing a shiPld against mi~sJLPs, 
Europedn~ wonder whether they would then not be left in an exposed positior1, 
facing ~ superior SoviPt conventional military force. 
rhe concerns may be 11nderstanuable, but will dim1n1sh wirh timP·and 
di~cussion. First of all, President RPagan's call for strategic defense 
b~ought the Russians back to the Geneva negotiating table. More importar1t, 
however, it will become increasingly evident to our friend~, as some ot the 
confusion about the technology dissipates, that the ab1lity of the United 
States to protect its missiles immeasurably strengthens our power to deter 
and thereby serves to protect our allies. Indeed, such a system is expected 
to be at least as effective against the SS-20's aimed at western Europe as it 
is against ICBM's. Finally, a development pulling the world away from the 
precipice of nuclear terror goes far to help create an encouraging atmosphere 
fer dialogue and agreement, a vital prerequisite for peace. 
ln light of the above, we reach two basic conclusions: 
(1J Developing a stabilising, limited two-tier strategic defense capability is 
de~irable and called for by the likely strategic conditions immediately ~head. 
Such a deployment would be helpful both in thP military and in thP political 
dimensions. It is a proper response to the challenge posed by political 
uncertainties and the dynamics of weapons development. The tw0-lay~rPd 
defense described here can be deployed by the early 1990's. Americans will 
rest easier when that limited defense is in place, for it will mean that 
the prospect of a Soviet first strike is almost nil. 
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<2> A three- or four-layer defense, using such advanced technologies as the 
laser now under investigation in the research phase of the Strategic Defense 
Inii~ative, may become a reality by the end of the century. If this research 
shvws an advanced system to be practical, its deployment may well boost the 
efficiency of our defense to a level so close to perfection as to signal a final 
end to the era of nuclear ballistic missiles. A research programme offering 
such enormous potential gains in our security must be pursued, in spite of 
th~ fact that a successful outcome cannot be assured at this juncture. 
The current debate is necessary. There are many questions, 
technical and political, ahead of us. For the debate to be construct;v~, 
however, we must overcome the tendency to politicise it on a partisan basis. 
Our objectives should be to find a way out of the current maze of world terror. 
The President's initiative toward that end is a major contribution to arms 
control and stability. The aim of making nuclear weapons impotent and absolete 
sh0uld be encouraged and not savaged. 
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